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SOCIAL MEDIA, MANIPULATION, AND VIOLENCE 
Allyson Haynes Stuart∗ 
For centuries now, inventions 
heralded as advances in human progress 
have been exploited by the criminal mind. 
New technologies, all too soon, can 
become instruments used to commit 
serious crimes. The railroad is one 
example . . . and the telephone another . . 
. . So, it will be with the Internet and 
social media.1 
 
Many of us lament the ubiquity of social media2 and 
the attention it takes from face-to-face activities, 
                                                          
 
∗ Allyson Haynes Stuart is a Professor of Law at Charleston School of 
Law.  She wishes to thank her research assistant, Michael Grabara, and the 
editorial staff of the South Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Business. This article follows the 2018 Symposium, "Innovation, Policy, & 
Technology in Law and Development," where Allyson Haynes Stuart was a 
featured panelist. 
1 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) 
(citations omitted). 
2 Social media refers to “forms of electronic communication (such as 
websites for social networking and microblogging) through which users 
create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, 
and other content (such as videos).”  Social Media, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/social%20media.  The social media websites 
(“sites”) I refer to primarily are Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and 
YouTube, which are also referred to as third-party platforms.  See Jonathan 
Peters & Brett Johnson, Conceptualizing Private Governance in A 
Networked Society, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 15, 49 (2016) (“Google, 
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particularly on the part of young people. Social media 
generally stresses the importance of appearance, and 
makes most of us believe our lives pale in comparison to 
everyone else on the planet.3 It has been linked to 
depression and low self-esteem in teenagers, and no one 
is completely sure of the long-term effects of small 
screen use on the body and brain.4 But this essay 
addresses an even darker side to social media: its use for 
manipulation on scales both small and large and its direct 
and indirect ties to violence. Increasingly, social media 
is used as a tool to foment violence, particularly in 
regions of the world where access to the Internet is 
otherwise limited. Even when a social media site is not 
itself an instrument to foment violence, it may have the 
effect of encouraging and validating the extreme views 
that result in violence. What is the role of social media 
sites in containing their use for such nefarious purposes, 
and how should the law govern them? Should such sites 
be liable for failing to take down misleading or 
                                                          
 
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are examples of third-party platforms that 
offer a variety of services that enable their users to share content.”). 
3 Note Facebook’s recent “10 Year Challenge,” which encouraged 
users to post pictures of how little they had changed in 10 years. See 
Rebecca Jennings, Why You’re Seeing the 10-Year Challenge Everywhere, 
VOX (Jan. 16, 2019, 5:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-
goods/2019/1/16/18185256/10-year-challenge-facebook-meme. 
4 A survey conducted by the Royal Society for Public Health of 14-24 
year olds in the United Kingdom found that Snapchat, Facebook, Twitter, 
and Instagram all led to increased feelings of depression, anxiety, poor body 
image, and loneliness.  See Rachel Ehmke, How Using Social Media Affects 
Teenagers, CHILD MIND INSTITUTE, https://childmind.org/article/how-
using-social-media-affects-teenagers/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). 
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inaccurate content or for allowing hate speech? If not, 
what are other options for controlling its misuse? 
I. UBIQUITY OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE U.S. AND AROUND 
THE GLOBE 
In a relatively short period of time, our world has 
been taken over by social media. Facebook is only fifteen 
years old, but sixty-eight percent of U.S. adults and fifty 
percent of U.S. teens use the social media platform.5  
Additionally, around forty percent of U.S. adults get 
their news from Facebook.6 Thus, social media sites 
have now surpassed print newspapers as a news source 
for Americans; twenty percent of U.S. adults surveyed 
say that they often get their news via social media, as 
opposed to the sixteen percent who obtain their news 
from print newspapers.7  
Globally, social media use has grown astoundingly.  
According to the Pew Research Center, seventy-five 
percent of adults in Jordan and an average of sixty-eight 
percent of adults in the Middle East and North Africa 
                                                          
 
5 See John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 1, 2019), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/02/01/facts-about-americans-and-facebook/. 
6 See id. 
7 In 2017, the portion of U.S. adults who got news via social media 
was about equal to the portion who got news from print newspapers. See 
Elisa Shearer, Social Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a 
News Source, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
(Dec. 10, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/social-
media-outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/.  
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now use social media.8 Worldwide, an average of sixty 
percent of adults use social media.9 In some countries, 
social media adoption has risen dramatically in the last 
few years. For example, “only forty-nine percent of 
Lebanese adults used social media in 2015, but in 2017, 
that number increased to seventy-two percent.”10  
Similarly, “just two years ago only fifty-one percent of 
South Korean adults were on social media, compared to 
almost sixty-nine percent in 2017.”11 
In certain countries, social media sites have a 
monopoly status.  In an extreme example, fewer than five 
percent of Myanmar’s population had mobile phones 
until 2014, when the government loosened restrictions 
and first allowed SIM cards to be sold at affordable 
levels.12 After that, a much greater number of people 
bought smartphones—and those phones were all 
                                                          
 
8 See Jacob Poushter, Caldwell Bishop & Hanyu Chwe, Social 
Network Adoption Varies Widely by Country, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 
19, 2018), http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/06/19/3-social-network-
adoption-varies-widely-by-country/. 
9 See id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12See Euan McKirdy, When Facebook Becomes ‘The Beast’: 
Myanmar Activists Say Social Media Aids Genocide, CNN (Apr. 6, 2018, 
8:05 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/06/asia/myanmar-facebook-
social-media-genocide-intl/index.html; See Megan Specia & Paul Mozur, A 
War of Words Puts Facebook at the Center of Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/asia/myanma
r-government-facebook-rohingya.html.  
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preinstalled with Facebook.13 The use of Facebook in 
Myanmar went from about two million in 2014 to over 
thirty million today.14 There, Facebook “is the Internet” 
and is the way most people get their news.15 That can 
have dire results when the news people receive is not 
necessarily true and is being used for improper 
purposes.16   
II.  THE DARK SIDE OF SOCIAL MEDIA USE  
There are myriad benefits from social media, like its 
use during the revolutions of the Arab Spring to put 
pressure on governments and spread truth in the face of 
propaganda.17 But there are three primary problems: 
                                                          
 
13 See Specia & Mozur, supra note 12. 
14 See id.  
15 See Barbara Ortutay, Facebook Admits Not Doing Enough to 
Prevent Myanmar Violence, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/nov/6/facebook-admits-not-
doing-enough-to-prevent-myanma/. 
16 See infra Incitement to Violence. 
17 See Kevin Gregg, “Text ‘Revolution’ to Vote”: Social Media’s Effect 
on Popular Consent and Legitimacy of New Regimes, 31 B.U. INT'L L.J. 
315, 334 (2013) (describing the significant role of camera-phone videos 
posted on Facebook in Tunisia’s popular revolution); Kitsuron Sangsuvan, 
Balancing Freedom of Speech on the Internet Under International Law, 39 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 701, 755 (2014) (“[T]he history books will 
also note that 2011 marked the beginning of a new age when mass protest, 
revolution and armed conflict was not only facilitated by, but made possible 
through, digital communication networks and social networking sites. 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube had transformed civil society’s 
engagement with, and in, warfare.”); Philip N. Howard et al., Opening 
Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab 
Spring?, PROJECT ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICAL ISLAM 
(2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
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misleading or inaccurate stories used to influence 
elections, misleading or inaccurate stories used to foment 
violence, and the more tangential effect on violence that 
results when people with extreme views find 
amplification and validation of those views on social 
media. 
A. ELECTIONS 
News had certain built-in safeguards when 
traditional media outlets controlled its distribution.  
Journalists and newspapers have reputations to protect, 
in addition to incentives to avoid liability, and so they 
follow safeguards that require source-vetting, 
fact-checking, and backup evidence.18 There is a level of 




Mazaid_PITPI.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y%20) (“Our evidence shows 
that social media was used heavily to conduct political conversations by a 
key demographic group in the revolution – young, urban, relatively well-
educated individuals, many of whom were women. Both before and during 
the revolutions, these individuals used Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to 
put pressure on their governments.”). 
18 See Washington Post Staff, About Us: Policies and Standards, 
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 1, 2016) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ask-the-
post/wp/2016/01/01/policies-and-
standards/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9f3bf843b3c4 (“The Post has a 
multi-level structure for the review and editing of stories that may include 
fact-checking. These include assignment editors (department heads, their 
deputy editors and assistant editors) who collaborate with reporters on the 
origination of stories and typically provide initial review when a story is 
submitted by a reporter; multiplatform editors (also called copy editors) 
who often provide initial review on breaking news stories and routinely 
provide second-level review on print and other less time-sensitive stories; 
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reliability in traditional news outlets that is not inherent 
in stories on social media. Additionally, the news sources 
themselves on social media may not always be what they 
appear. Russia, via its government Internet Research 
Agency, uses misleading website names to suggest its 
stories are coming from the U.S. rather than Russia.19 As 
they say, “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a 
dog.”20 
The public has known for some time about Russia’s 
interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election on 
social media, but in December 2018 two expert reports 
revealed a trove of details.21  The Senate commissioned 
                                                          
 
and senior editors who have overall oversight of the daily and weekend 
report for digital publication throughout the day as well as The Post’s print 
editions. Editors who oversee digital platforms also may be involved in the 
presentation of stories as well as headlines, news alerts and newsletters. The 
number of editors who review a story prior to publication and the extent of 
their involvement varies depending on a range of factors, including 
complexity, sensitivity, and the pressure of time.”). 
19 The website usareally.com is funded by the sponsors of the Russian 
“troll factory” accused of interference in the 2016 US Presidential election. 
See Russia Protests After Journalist Detained, Interrogated at DC Airport, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 11, 2018), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/nov/11/alexander-
malkevich-usa-really-editor-detained-dc-/.  
20 See Michael Cavna, ‘Nobody Knows You’re A Dog’: As Iconic 
Internet Cartoon Turns 20, Creator Peter Steiner Knows The Joke Rings As 






21 One report was prepared by social media analysts New Knowledge 
and the other by an Oxford University team working with analytical firm 
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the expert reports as part of its bipartisan investigation of 
Russian interference, and the reports are based largely on 
data about the Russian operations provided to the Senate 
by Facebook, Twitter, and the other companies whose 
platforms were used.22 The reports describe the ongoing 
efforts of the Russian government’s Internet Research 
Agency, based in St. Petersburg, Russia, to erode trust in 
U.S. democratic institutions and to divide Americans by 
race and extreme ideology.23 Part of that effort included 
targeting African-Americans.24 On Facebook and 
Instagram, Russians specifically targeted black 
American communities using Gmail accounts with 
American-sounding names to recruit and sometimes pay 
unwitting American activists to stage rallies and spread 
content.25  One tactic was using Facebook ads targeted at 
users who had shown interest in particular topics, 
including black history, the Black Panther Party, and 
                                                          
 
Graphika.  See Mark Hosenball, Russia Used Social Media for Widespread 
Meddling in U.S. Politics: Reports, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2018, 2:18 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-socialmedia/russia-
used-social-media-for-widespread-meddling-in-u-s-politics-reports-
idUSKBN1OG257?il=0.    
22 See Renee DiResta et al., The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet 
Research Agency, NEW KNOWLEDGE, 
https://disinformationreport.blob.core.windows.net/disinformation-
report/NewKnowledge-Disinformation-Report-Whitepaper.pdf.  
23 See Hosenball, supra note 21. 
24 See Scott Shane & Sheera Frenkel, Russian 2016 Influence 
Operation Targeted African-Americans on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/us/politics/russia-2016-
influence-campaign.html. 
25 See DiResta et al., supra note 22, at 34. 
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Malcolm X.26 The most popular of the Russian 
Instagram accounts was @blackstagram, with 303,663 
followers, while on YouTube, the largest share of 
Russian material covered the Black Lives Matter 
movement and police brutality, with channels called 
“Don’t Shoot” and “BlackToLive.”27 The expert reports 
revealed that, while much attention has been focused on 
Facebook, the Internet Research Agency in fact created 
social media accounts under fake names on virtually 
every available platform,28 with the goal of supporting 
Donald J. Trump as a candidate in the Republican 
primary, then in the general election, and as president 
since his election.29   
In April of 2019, Special Counsel Robert Mueller 
released his long-awaited investigative report of 
Russian interference in the 2016 election.  The report 
further detailed the actions of the Russian troll farm 
Internet Research Agency and its social media 
interference dating back to 2014, including the use of 
fake Facebook accounts.30 
                                                          
 
26 See id.  
27 See id. at 30. 
28 See Shane & Frenkel, supra note 24.   
29 See Craig Timberg & Tony Romm, New Report on Russian 
Disinformation Prepared for the Senate, Shows the Operation’s Scale and 




30 See Dustin Volz & Allan Cullison, ‘Putin Has Won’: Mueller Report 
Details the Ways Russia Interfered in the 2016 Election, Wall St. J. (Apr. 
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Facebook plays a prominent role in an additional 
social media election scandal involving Cambridge 
Analytica and one of the largest data leaks in social 
media history.31 Cambridge Analytica was a voter 
profiling company started in 2014 by Steve Bannon and 
Robert Mercer, using a psychographics platform 
developed by Christopher Wylie and Aleksandr Kogan, 
that mapped personality traits based on what people liked 
on Facebook.32 The company’s goal was to develop 
detailed psychological profiles of every American voter 
so that campaigns could tailor their pitches from person 
to person.33 To that end, the company created an 
application for Facebook with a personality quiz that 
asked 120 questions about personality and behavior.34 
Then, it scored people on traits like openness, 
extroversion, and agreeableness, and mixed those results 
with polls, voter records, and online activity in order to 
create personality models for voters.35  Users of the app 




31See Carole Cadwalladr, Nicholas Confessore & Matthew Rosenberg, 
How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-
trump-campaign.html. 
32 See id.  
33 See Scott Detrow, What Did Cambridge Analytica Do During the 
2016 Election?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/20/595338116/what-did-cambridge-
analytica-do-during-the-2016-election. 
34 See id.  
35 See id. 
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– about 270,000 people – technically consented to 
having their data harvested when they took the quiz 
(including education, location, the groups and pages they 
liked, their relationship status, and where they 
worked).36 But the app also gathered information from 
the friends of those users, amounting to about “50 
million raw profiles” that were provided to Cambridge 
Analytica.37 The company then used that data for 
targeted advertisements and other election-related efforts 
on behalf of conservative candidates.38 Most notably, the 
data was used to support Donald Trump in the 2016 
election, when Cambridge Analytica designed target 
audiences for digital advertisements and fundraising 
appeals, modeled voter turnout, bought television 
advertisements, and determined where then-candidate 
Trump should travel to increase his support.39   
The U.S. is not alone in experiencing election 
interference via social media use.40 The democracy 
advocacy group Freedom House found that at least 
                                                          
 
36 See id.; Rosenberg, supra note 31. 
37 See Rosenberg, supra note 31. The app violated Facebook rules both 
in gathering data for a purpose other than the research purpose that was 
disclosed, and for violating a loophole in Facebook’s architecture that 
allowed the app to harvest data of users who had not given permission.   
38 See id.  
39 See id. 
40 See Jackie Snow, Last Year, Social Media Was Used to Influence 
Elections in at Least 18 Countries, MIT TECH REV. (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/609478/last-year-
social-media-was-used-to-influence-elections-in-at-least-18-countries/. 
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seventeen other countries also had their elections 
manipulated through social media throughout 2016.41 
B. INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE 
Facebook has also been tied to violence in countries 
where the social media platform has been used to foment 
action against disfavored groups.42 In Myanmar, 
Facebook has an outsized importance because of the way 
the country’s Internet use developed.43 Until 2014, fewer 
than 5% of individuals there used mobile phones because 
they were prohibitively expensive.44 That year, changes 
in government policies lowered the price of SIM cards, 
allowing a much greater number of people to afford 
them.45 Importantly, those mobile phones were usually 
programmed to include Facebook and its messaging 
application.46 Users had little experience with the 
Internet before having mobile phones, therefore for 
many in Myanmar, Facebook “is the Internet.”47 The 
social media platform has been used to target the 
disenfranchised Rohingya Muslim minority, which has 
been the target of a sustained campaign of violence and 
                                                          
 
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
43 See McKirdy, supra note 12. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. 
47 See Ortutay, supra note 15. 
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abuse by the Myanmar military that the United Nations 
calls “ethnic cleansing”.48 
Ultra-nationalist Buddhists have used Facebook to 
publish hate speech and foment violence against the 
Rohingya. This includes posting fake pictures of the 
Muslims burning their own homes and of decaying 
bodies they said were Buddhist victims of Rohingya 
attacks, and using the Facebook messenger service to 
forward messages warning of incoming attacks by 
Muslims.49  In September 2017, the Buddhists warned of 
a fabricated “jihad,” which incited a “call to arms” 
against the Muslims.50 The purge of Muslims and 
subsequent refugee crisis have seen 700,000 Rohingya 
forced from their homes.51  
Sri Lanka is another example where there have been 
instances of hate speech used against the Muslim 
minority.52  In March 2018, parts of Sri Lanka’s Central 
Province experienced a wave of anti-Muslim riots, which 
the government blamed on hate speech against the 
Muslim community that was spread over Facebook, 
WhatsApp, Instagram, and Viber.53 There are also 
                                                          
 
48 See Specia & Mozur, supra note 12; McKirdy, supra note 12. 
49 See Specia & Mozur, supra note 12. 
50 See McKirdy, supra note 12. 
51 See id. 
52See Amantha Perera, Social Media – the New Testing Ground for Sri 
Lanka’s Freedom, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY (July 18, 2018), 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2018/07/social-media-new-testing-ground-sri-
lankas-freedom/. 
53 See id. 
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examples of people trolling journalists and using threats 
to prevent them from telling the truth.54 Between five 
and six million Sri Lankans use Facebook, and research 
shows that social media is the primary platform of 
political interaction for Sri Lankans between eighteen 
and thirty-four.55 Misinformation, disinformation, and 
threats to journalists have risen sharply.56 
In India, there are infamous examples of social media 
weaponization.57 In July 2018, a mob lynched five 
people after rumors spread, via WhatsApp messages, 
that these people were child abductors.58 The victims 
were poor agricultural workers from a nearby district, 
who were surrounded and attacked by a crowd of about 
three thousand people.59 Earlier that week, three  more 
people were killed in another part of India after social 
media rumors spread of child abduction and human 
organ harvesting.60 Mobs have killed people in at least 
three other instances, all related to fake rumors circulated 
mostly through WhatsApp groups.61 
                                                          
 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57See generally Swati Gupta & Bard Wilkinson, WhatsApp India: Five 
lynched after online child kidnap rumors, CNN (July 3, 2018, 4:37 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/02/asia/india-lynching-whatsapp-
intl/index.html (providing examples of recent weaponization of social 
media). 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. (discussing similar mob attacks in India).  
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Finally, to a lesser extent, conspiracy theorists have 
touted their beliefs online in the U.S. and sparked 
violence. In response to Alex Jones’s assertion that the 
2012 Sandy Hook Elementary mass shooting was a hoax 
perpetrated by gun control advocates, Mr. Jones’s 
supporters harassed the grieving parents of child 
victims.62 And after the circulation of the bizarre 
Pizzagate conspiracy theory, alleging that Hillary 
Clinton and other Democrats were secretly running a 
child-sex ring, one supporter brought an assault rifle to a 
Washington, D.C. pizza restaurant, vowing to save the 
children locked in the basement.63 
C. FOMENTING HATE 
Aside from direct incitement of violence, social 
media links to violence in more insidious ways. There is 
a tie between recent shootings in the U.S. and a history 
of social media radicalization. Before Cesar Sayoc 
allegedly sent fourteen pipe bombs through the mail to 
prominent Democrats around the country, he had 
become radicalized online and was “sucked into a vortex 
                                                          
 
62 See Kevin Roose, Cesar Sayoc’s Path on Social Media: From Food 
Photos to Partisan Fury, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/technology/cesar-sayoc-facebook-
twitter.html.  
63 See Spencer S. Hsu, ‘Pizzagate’ Gunman Sentenced To Four Years 
In Prison, As Prosecutors Urged Judge To Deter Vigilante Justice, WASH. 
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of partisan furor.”64  Beginning in 2016, Sayoc started 
posting right-wing news stories, pro-Donald Trump 
images, and stories about Muslims and the Islamic State 
on Twitter and Facebook.65 Weeks before the 2018 
bombings, Sayoc had posted violent fantasies and threats 
against several people to whom pipe bombs were sent, 
including Democratic representatives, prominent 
liberals, and Trump critics.66 On social media he found a 
home for his more strident views, including conspiracy 
theories involving the Clintons, Barack Obama, George 
Soros, and illegal immigration.67 Many subjects of his 
tweets were targeted with mailbombs.68   
Robert Bowers, the suspected gunman who killed 11 
people at a Philadelphia synagogue, was an avid user of 
the social media site Gab.69 Unlike mainstream social 
                                                          
 
64 See Nicole Chavez, Cesar Sayoc Was a DJ, Bodybuilder and Pizza 
Delivery Man Before He Became a Bomb Suspect, CNN (Oct. 27, 2018, 
9:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/27/politics/cesar-sayoc-mail-
bomb-suspect/index.html. 
65 See Julie Turkewitz & Kevin Roose, Who Is Robert Bowers, the 
Suspect in the Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/us/robert-bowers-pittsburgh-
synagogue-shooter.html.  
66 See Roose, supra note 62, at A20.  
67 See id. 
68 See Benjamin Weiser, Mail Bomb Suspect Accused of Targeting 
Clinton, Obama and Other Democrats to Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
15, 2019, at A21 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/nyregion/mail-
bomber-cesar-sayoc.html.  
69 See Becky Metrick, Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting Suspect used 
Social Media Platform Created by Pa. Native, PA. REAL-TIME NEWS, (Mar. 
27, 2019, 9:27 AM), https://www.pennlive.com/news/2019/03/an-
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media, Gab is infamous for allowing racist, anti-Semitic, 
and bigoted comments.70 Bowers frequently used the site 
to criticize and threaten Jews; he referred to Jews as 
children of Satan, and the enemy of white people.71  He 
accused Jews of aiding migrant caravan “invasions.”72  
Five minutes before police were alerted to the shooting, 
Bowers posted on the site: “[I] can’t sit by and watch my 
people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going 
in.”73 
Scott Paul Beierle killed two people and wounded 
five others in a Tallahassee yoga studio before turning 
the gun on himself.74  Evidence shows that he, like Sayoc 
and Bowers, bore a grudge against a certain group and 
found kinship for that hatred on social media.75 Beierle 




70 See Alina Selyukh, Feeling Sidelined by Mainstream Social Media, 
Far-Right Users Jump to Gab, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Mar. 27, 2019, 9:25 
AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/05/21/529005840/fee
ling-sidelined-by-mainstream-social-media-far-right-users-jump-to-gab.   
71 See Saeed Ahmed & Paul P. Murphy, Here’s What We Know So Far 
About Robert Bowers, the Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting Suspect, CNN, 
(Oct. 28, 2018, 7:14 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/27/us/synagogue-
attack-suspect-robert-bowers-profile/index.html. 
72 See id. 
73 Id. 
74 See Dakin Adone & Artemis Moshtaghian, Gunman in Florida Yoga 
Studio Shooting made Misogynistic Comments on Youtube, CNN, (Mar. 27, 
2019, 9:36 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/03/us/tallahassee-
shooting-yoga-studio/index.html.  
75 See Anna North, How Mass Shooters Practice Their Hate Online, 
VOX MED. (Nov. 3, 2018, 9:19 PM) 
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made numerous racist and misogynistic comments in 
Youtube videos and identified with “involuntary 
celebates.”76 He made violent comments about women 
who rejected him, and he expressed sympathy toward 
Elliot Roger, who killed 6 people and injured others in 
Santa Barbara after posting a manifesto blaming the 
cruelty of women for his own virginity.77   
In probably the worst example yet of online 
extremism leading to offline violence, an Australian 
man fatally shot 51 Muslim worshippers and injured 39 
others at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand.78  
Just before the attack, he published a link on a right-
wing forum to a 74-page white supremacist manifesto.79  
He then used a camera mounted to his head to 
livestream the attack on Facebook.80 The New York 
Times reported that “[t]he gunman appeared to pair the 
shooting with the typical trolling tactics of the internet’s 
most far-right instigators, playing to a community of 




76 See id.  
77 See id.  
78 Charlotte Graham-McLay, Death Toll in New Zealand Mosque 
Shooting Rises to 51, N.Y. TIMES, (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/world/asia/new-zealand-attack-
death-toll.html. 
79 Kevin Roose, A Mass Murder of, and for, the Internet, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/technology/
facebook-youtube-christchurch-shooting.html. 
80 Id. 
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like-minded supporters online who cheered him on in 
real time as they watched bodies pile up.”81 
 
While social media did not cause these individuals to 
take the action they did, it provided an echo chamber for 
their disturbed views, validated those views, and 
encouraged hate.82 Bowers seemed to see himself as 
having an audience on social media for whom he was 
performing in slaughtering people.83 The New Zealand 
shooter quoted Bowers (“screw your optics”) in a posting 
before he began his own horrific live performance.84 The 
Internet did not create hate, but it has given hate a 
worldwide platform. 
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
Social media sites themselves are increasingly 
addressing the problems of manipulation and violence.85  
In addition, many countries have opted for government 
                                                          
 
81 Daniel Victor, In Christchurch, Signs Point to a Gunman Steeped in 




82 See id.   
83 See Turkewitz & Roose, supra note 65.   
84 Roose, supra note 79. 
85See, e.g., Alex Hern, WhatsApp to Restrict Message Forwarding 
After India Mob Lynchings, GUARDIAN (July 20, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/20/whatsapp-to-limit-
message-forwarding-after-india-mob-lynchings.  
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action to address online hate.86 The action of the sites has 
been criticized as doing too little, while the action of 
governments has been criticized as doing too much.87 
Either way, limits on “bad” speech risk censorship of 
“good” speech.  
A. GOVERNMENT ACTION 
One solution to problematic use of social media sites 
is for governments to control any such use for improper 
means.88 However, government action too often amounts 
to outright censorship.89 After the March 2018 anti-
Muslim riots in Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan government 
responded with a weeklong shutdown of Facebook, 
WhatsApp, Instagram, and Viber.90 In addition to 
censorship, government action often targets social media 
speech critical of its own actions.91 The Chinese 
government is infamous for Internet censorship, 
imposing a system of Internet filters known as the Great 
                                                          
 
86 See e.g, Saritha Rai, India Seeks Access to Private Messages in 
WhatsApp Crackdown, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13, 2019, 6:50 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-13/india-targets-
facebook-evil-in-backlash-against-u-s-giants. 
87 See generally DiResta et al., supra note 22. 
88 See, e.g., Howard, supra note 17. 
89 See id. 
90 See Perera, supra note 52. 
91 See Mirae Yang, The Collision of Social Media and Social Unrest: 
Why Shutting Down Social Media Is the Wrong Response, 11 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 707, 709 (2013) (discussing Egypt’s shutdown of Internet 
and cell phone service in response to civil unrest). 
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Firewall to block content and shut out foreign technology 
companies.92  
Now, India is accused of following that model and 
proposing strong, new measures that would allow Indian 
officials to demand that online platforms like Facebook 
and Twitter remove posts or videos that they deem 
libelous, invasive of privacy, hateful, or 
deceptive.93 Those sites would be responsible for the 
content their users share.94 In addition, the Indian 
government has cracked down on WhatsApp, by 
pressing the service to provide access to encrypted 
messages.95  
In the European Union, data protection laws strongly 
protect users of social media, and in some instances 
require companies to remove material from their sites or 
scrub links to particular stories.96  Under the “right to be 
                                                          
 
92 See Vindu Goel, India Proposes Chinese-Style Internet Censorship, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/technology/india-internet-
censorship.html?smid=tw-nytimesbits&smtyp=cur.  
93 See id. 
94 See Rai, supra note 86 (draft published on the government’s website 
suggests the guidelines would hold these services responsible for a broad 
range of content, including information found to be “blasphemous, 
defamatory, obscene, pornographic, pedophilic, libelous, invasive of 
another’s privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically objectionable, disparaging, 
relating or encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise 
unlawful in any manner whatever”). 
95 See id.; See also Goel, supra note 92. 
96 See Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) (General Data 
Protection Directive Regulation or “GDPR”); Directive 95/46/EC, art. 12, 
1995 O.J. (L 281). 
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forgotten,” citizens have a right to their own personal 
information, and the right to demand that data be deleted 
when it is no longer necessary for the legitimate purposes 
for which it was gathered.97  Google, which is the search 
engine used by a whopping 95% of Europeans, was first 
ordered to take down links in Spain in May 2014,98 and 
has since been asked to delete links to 2.9 million 
websites.99 The right to be forgotten or “right to erasure” 
was enshrined in the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), which went into effect in 2018.100 
Even if we wanted this kind of control over Internet 
speech in the U.S., such action would likely be deemed 
unconstitutional.  Protection of free speech in the U.S. is 
“unparalleled elsewhere in the world.”101 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has specifically acknowledged the 
importance of free speech on social media websites such 
                                                          
 
97 Id. (Under the GDPR, an EU citizen has the right to demand that an 
organization erases her personal data if, among other reasons, the data is no 
longer relevant to the reason it was collected or if she withdraws consent to 
the data being used.  This right is limited, for example, by the organization’s 
right to freedom of expression and if the data is in the public interest.) 
98 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de 
Proteccion de Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317. 
99 See id.; Google Wins Bout in Fight Against ‘Right to Be Forgotten’, 
LIVEMINT (Jan. 11, 2019, 6:49 AM), 
https://www.livemint.com/Companies/tUyyXERKejWs08dnovzFJM/Goo
gle-can-limit-right-to-be-forgotten-to-EU-Top-court-ad.html (France has 
unsuccessfully attempted to globalize the EU’s orders that Google delete 
links.) 
100 See GDPR Art. 17, Part 1, Right to Erasure (2018) 
https://www.gdpreu.org/the-regulation/list-of-data-rights/right-to-erasure/. 
101 Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Balancing Freedom of Speech on the Internet 
Under International Law, 39 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 701, 716 (2014). 
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as Facebook.102 The Court interprets the First 
Amendment to require that any content-based 
restrictions on speech will be presumed invalid, and the 
government has the burden of showing those restrictions 
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest.103 Although the First Amendment provides less 
protection to obscenity, defamation, and threats of 
violence, it would certainly protect speech that is true but 
“no longer necessary” as the GDPR would condemn.104    
In addition, U.S. law protects social media websites 
from any liability based on what others post to those 
sites. Since passage of the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996 (CDA), social media and other sites have 
been immunized from liability based on content 
provided by a third party.105 Section 230 of the CDA 
protects Internet providers and Internet-related services 
                                                          
 
102 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) 
(“While in the past there may have been difficulty identifying the most 
important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the 
answer is clear.  It is cyberspace – the ‘vast democratic forums of the 
Internet’ in general, and social media in particular. . . . One of the most 
popular of these sites is Facebook . . .”). 
103 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004). 
104 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) 
(noting that “these areas of speech can, consistently with the First 
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable 
content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech 
entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles 
for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable 
content. Thus, the government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the 
further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the 
government.”). 
105 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). 
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— such as social media platforms106 — by prohibiting 
those platforms from being treated as “the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”107 The Section 
establishes federal immunity to any cause of action that 
would make a social media site liable for information 
originating from a third-party user, even when the 
platform has actual knowledge of harmful content.108   
Because of this immunity, any legal challenges to the 
way social media sites control their content would likely 
                                                          
 
106 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (including 
a listserv email newsletter sent by a website operator within the definition 
of interactive computer service); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 
F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a matchmaking and dating 
website is an interactive computer service); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 
F.3d 327, 330 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997) (concluding that America Online fell 
within the definition of interactive service provider); Klayman v. 
Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Facebook qualifies as 
interactive computer service because it “provides information to ‘multiple 
users’ by giving them ‘computer access…to a computer server’…namely 
the servers that host social networking websites.” (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 
230(f)(2) (2012))). 
107 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). 
108 See id. at § 230(c)(1); Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1358 (The immunity 
is contingent on three conditions: (1) the party seeking immunity is a 
“provider or user of an interactive computer service”; (2) the claim treats 
the party seeking immunity “as the publisher or speaker” of the disputed 
content; and (3) the claim is based on content produced “by another 
information content provider.”; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (Alternatively, 
providers cannot claim immunity when an action arises out of content the 
ICSP produced itself. However, a service’s capability to control or remove 
content posted on their social media website does not void its immunity.) 
This incentivizes services to willingly regulate and improve their content 
while keeping their protection intact. 
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require legislative changes.109 Recently, Congress has 
focused on problems posed by unchecked use of social 
media. Legislators have introduced several bills in 
Congress and in states like California that would increase 
privacy protections for users of social media in light of 
the Cambridge Analytica scandal.110 Specifically, 
Congress seems increasingly willing to weaken the 
immunity granted to social media sites under the 
CDA.111  In April 2018, a new law went into effect that 
limits the immunity provided under CDA Section 230 for 
online services that knowingly host third-party content 
to promote or facilitate sex trafficking.112 The law 
removes CDA immunity for those online platforms with 
respect to state criminal charges if the conduct 
underlying the state violation would constitute a 
                                                          
 
109 See id. 
110 See Customer Online Notification for Stopping Edge-Provider 
Network Transgressions (“CONSENT Act”), S. 2639, 115th Cong. (2018) 
(requiring websites to notify customers about the collection, use, and 
sharing of sensitive customer proprietary information of the customer, and 
to obtain opt-in consent to use, share, or sell the sensitive information of 
customer); Social Media Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 
2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019) (requiring online platform operators to 
inform a user, prior to a user creating an account or otherwise using the 
platform, that the user's personal data produced during online behavior will 
be collected and used by the operator and third parties, along with the option 
to specify privacy preferences, and requiring notification within 72 hours 
violation of a user’s data security); Assembly 288, 2018-2019 Sess. (Cal. 
2019) (requiring social media companies to allow users to have their 
personally identifiable information permanently removed from the 
company’s database and records upon closing of their accounts). 
111 See 47 U.S.C. § 230, supra note 105. 
112 See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act 
of 2017 (“FOSTA”), H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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violation of anti sex-trafficking statutes; the law removes 
immunity for FOSTA-related civil suits brought by 
victims against online services that knowingly promote 
or facilitate sex trafficking through such activities as 
hosting third-party posts, listings and advertisements. 113 
At a July 2018 hearing in the House Judiciary 
Committee on social media filtering practices, a 
Congressman suggested to representatives of Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube that further exceptions to CDA 
immunity could be in the works.114 At a hearing in 
December 2018 on Google’s business practices, 
Congress members criticized the broad protections that 
Section 230 provides to platforms such as Google.115  
One bill has been introduced that would remove Section 
230 immunity when social media companies use 
algorithms to alter and filter content.116 
                                                          
 
113 See Jeffrey Neuburger, FOSTA Signed into Law, Amends CDA 
Section 230 to Allow Enforcement Against Online Providers for Knowingly 
Facilitating Sex Trafficking, PROSKAUER: NEW MEDIA AND TECH. L. BLOG 
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2018/04/11/fosta-
signed-into-law-amends-cda-section-230-to-allow-enforcement-against-
online-providers-for-knowingly-facilitating-sex-trafficking/. 
114 See Issie Lapowski, Lawmakers Don’t Grasp the Sacred Tech Law 
They Want to Gut, WIRED (July 17, 2018, 5:47 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/lawmakers-dont-grasp-section-230/. 
115 See Jeff Kosseff, Congress Could Still Break the Internet. Here’s 
How (Opinion), GOV’T TECH. (Dec. 17, 2018), 
http://www.govtech.com/policy/Congress-Could-Still-Break-the-Internet-
Heres-How-Opinion.html. 
116 See Biased Algorithm Deterrence Act of 2019, H.R. 492, 116th 
Cong. (2019). Based on the press release accompanying the bill’s 
introduction, its primary purpose is to counter alleged social media bias 
against conservative views. See Press Release, Louie Gohmert, Member, 
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There are many problems associated with limiting 
social media sites’ immunity.  The CDA has been widely 
credited with allowing the Internet to flourish and 
changing website immunity from liability risks self-
censorship and suppression of lawful speech.117   
B. ACTION BY SOCIAL MEDIA SITES 
The most obvious solution to misuse of social media 
is for those sites themselves to crack down on misuse in 
the form of manipulation and hate speech, although this 
too comes with risks to free expression.118 While the 
sites have community standards and guidelines for use, 
                                                          
 
U.S. House of Representatives, Gohmert Statement on Bill that Removes 
Liability Protections for Social Media Companies (Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://gohmert.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3986
76.  
117 See Jonathan Zittrain, CDA 230 Then and Now: Does Intermediary 
Immunity Keep the Rest of Us Healthy? (Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://blogs.harvard.edu/jzwrites/2018/08/31/cda-230-then-and-now/ (The 
Internet’s development over the past twenty years has benefited 
immeasurably from the immunities conferred by Section 230. We’ve been 
lucky to have it. But any honest account must acknowledge the collateral 
damage it has permitted to be visited upon real people whose reputations, 
privacy, and dignity have been hurt in ways that defy redress. Especially as 
that damage becomes more systematized – now part of organized 
campaigns to shame people into silence online for expressing opinions that 
don’t fit an aggressor’s propaganda aims – platforms’ failures to moderate 
become more costly, both to targets of harassment and to everyone else 
denied exposure to honestly-held ideas.). 
118 While social media sites are not bound by constitutional restrictions 
on government action, they have been likened to public spaces where 
restrictions on free speech should be prohibited.  See Colby M. Everett, Free 
Speech on Privately-Owned Fora: A Discussion on Speech Freedoms and 
Policy for Social Media, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 127, (2018) 
(“Social media is a modern-age public forum.”). 
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and respond to complaints by, in some instances, taking 
down posts or banning users from their sites, these 
measures are often not enough to prevent manipulation 
and violence.119   
Some sites have acknowledged as much and made 
recent efforts to do better, particularly in response to the 
violence that has resulted in Myanmar and India.  In July 
2018, Facebook pledged that it would begin removing 
information in Myanmar that could lead to people being 
physically harmed.120 In August of that year, Facebook 
banned Myanmar’s military chief and nineteen other 
individuals and organizations from the network in order 
to prevent the hate speech and propaganda.121 And three 
months later, Facebook admitted it did not do enough to 
prevent the violence and hate speech in Myanmar, 
vowing to “do more” to protect human rights.122  In 
India, WhatsApp attempted to crack down on the viral 
spread of misinformation through its service by limiting 
the ability to forward messages to only twenty people.123 
In the U.S., Facebook removed the account of 
suspect Cesar Sayoc, but only after the story emerged of 
                                                          
 
119 See Everett, at 120–21 (“Social media websites utilize community 
guidelines and moderation to retain users and protect business interests. 
These websites outsource a vast majority of moderation to armies of 
overseas contractors who screen flagged information and make judgment 
calls based on guideline compliance. The rest is left to algorithms.”). 
120 See Frenkel, supra note 24. 
121 See Ortutay, supra note 15. 
122 See id. 
123 See Hern, supra note 85. 
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Sayoc’s mailing of pipe bombs.124 A Facebook 
representative said that several of Sayoc’s previous posts 
violated Facebook’s community standards and had been 
removed before his arrest but that none of his posts, 
reported to or discovered by Facebook, contained 
violations of its rules severe enough to remove the 
account entirely.125 And while a political commentator 
had complained to Twitter about Sayoc’s threats to her 
prior to his sending the pipe bombs, Twitter had said he 
had not violated their rules against abuse.126  
Criticism prompted by the livestreamed New 
Zealand shooting led to Facebook’s institution of 
measures to limit livestreaming127 and to combat use of 
its site by white nationalists.128  On March 27, 2019, 
Facebook announced that it was imposing “a ban on 
                                                          
 
124 See Jason Hanna, Evan Perez, Scott Glover, Steve Almasy & Ray 
Sanchez, Bomb Suspect Arrest: What We Know About Cesar Sayoc, CNN 
Politics (Oct. 26, 2018, 10:56 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/26/politics/suspicious-packages-
arrest/index.html. 
125 See id. 
126 See Donie O’Sullivan, Bomb Suspect Threatened People on 
Twitter, and Twitter Didn’t Act, CNN (Oct. 27, 2018, 10:12 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/26/tech/cesar-sayoc-twitter-
response/index.html.  
127 See Heather Kelly, Facebook Changes Livestream Rules After New 
Zealand Shooting, CNN (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/14/tech/facebook-livestream-
changes/index.html. 
128 Facebook Newsroom, Mar. 27, 2019, 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/03/standing-against-hate/. 
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praise, support and representation of white nationalism 
and white separatism on Facebook and Instagram.”129 
 
After criticism that it was becoming a hub for “nut-
case” conspiracy theories, YouTube began appending 
Wikipedia blurbs to videos espousing such theories and 
began giving priority to reliable news sources over 
partisans in search results for breaking news stories.130  
Next, YouTube announced it was changing its 
recommendations algorithm to reduce the spread of 
“borderline content and content that could misinform 
users in harmful ways.”131 Most recently, YouTube 
announced plans to remove videos and channels “that 
advocate neo-Nazism, white supremacy and other 
bigoted ideologies in an attempt to clean up extremism 
and hate speech” on its service.132 
In an extreme case, a social media site that does not 
control hate speech may find itself closed off from the 
Internet altogether. After the Pittsburg synagogue 
shooting and revelations that the suspected gunman used 
the social network site Gab to threaten Jews, numerous 
                                                          
 
129 Id. 
130 See Kevin Roose, YouTube Unleased a Conspiracy Theory, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018, 6:30 PM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/technology/youtube-conspiracy-
stars.html. 
131 See id. 
132 Kevin Roose & Kate Conger, YouTube to Remove Thousands of 
Videos Pushing Extreme Views, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/business/youtube-remove-
extremist-videos.html. 
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Internet infrastructure providers, including payment 
processing firm Paypal, hosting service Joyent, domain 
register Godaddy, and numerous app stores, banned the 
site. 133 Paypal explained its decision by stating that it 
would not affiliate with a site that “explicitly allow[s] the 
perpetuation of hate, violence or discriminatory 
intolerance.”134 A similar fate befell the neo-Nazi 
website Daily Stormer after the violence during a white 
supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.135 
C. FURTHER ACTION 
There are enormous difficulties in policing speech on 
social media sites like Facebook, because the site must 
respond to users who have customs that are unfamiliar to 
Facebook employees and who speak in varying 
dialects.136 But social media sites should continue to “do 
more.” Facebook needs to ensure that it has the 
manpower and knowledge to do the reviewing of content 
that it promises in its community standards.137 Social 
media sites should continue to tweak algorithms and 
recommendations to favor verifiable news over false 
news and conspiracy theories, so as not to add to the 
                                                          
 
133 See Ivana Kottasova & Sara Ashley O’Brien, Gab, the Social 
Network Used by the Pittsburgh Suspect, Has Been Taken Offline, Cnn: 
Business (Oct. 29, 2018, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/29/tech/gab-offline-pittsburgh/index.html. 
134 Id. 
135 See Everett, supra note 118 at 114. (2018). 
136 See McKirdy, supra note 12 (noting the difficulty Facebook faces 
in monitoring the rise of hate speech in Myanmar because of language 
difficulties). 
137 See Facebook Community Standards, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ (last visited Apr. 2, 
2019).  
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problem when the false stories trend. Adding disclaimers 
next to false stories is a good step. 
Second, government should continue to step in when 
social media manipulation equates to foreign 
interference in elections.  The U.S. should make election 
interference a priority of foreign policy diplomacy, 
attempt to negotiate cross-border prosecution of 
offenders, or enter treaties where members promise not 
to use cyber election interference.  
Third, hand in hand with its engagement abroad, 
government must cooperate with the technology industry 
and social media websites themselves in finding 
solutions. Congress can work with Facebook and other 
sites to make progress on these issues without stifling 
Internet speech or enacting technological solutions that 
will be quickly obsolete. New Zealand’s Prime Minister 
has issued a “Christchurch Call,” an effort to enlist 
companies like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to do 
more to curb violent and extremist content.138 Seventeen 
countries, the European Commission, and eight large 
technology companies have signed onto the call.139  
Finally, one solution will be self-enacting. With 
time, social media users should become more Internet-
                                                          
 
138 See Jamie Tarabay, As New Zealand Fights Online Hate, the 




6eb8211796809&regi_id=555121730706. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern 
also responded to the Christchurch shootings by refusing to utter the 
shooter’s name, banning the sharing or viewing of the shooter’s manifesto, 
and tightening gun laws.  
139 Id. 
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savvy, particularly in areas where Internet use is still 
developing. Additionally, monopolies on users’ social 
media attention should break down, as we already see 
users abandoning Facebook in favor of sites like 
Snapchat. And with time, more content can be developed 
to drown out untruthful or hateful content.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Social media is here to stay, and with it come true 
dangers as well as benefits. The 2016 presidential 
election has shown us that our social media sites can be 
used to taint the very basis of our democracy – our 
election system. Violence in India and Myanmar has 
erupted in direct response to false stories that could only 
be spread with such speed and breadth via social media 
sites. And other violence, like mass shootings, can be 
tied directly to social media sites where troubled 
individuals find like-minded peers and fan the flames of 
hate and derangement. These problems must be 
addressed by social media sites and by the government, 
but with care not to destroy the freedom of speech that 
social media epitomizes. As the Supreme Court noted in 
2017, new technologies will be exploited for criminal 
means. The solution includes improving the technology, 
not destroying it. 
